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ABSTRACT 
States around the world have signed several modern investment 
treaties and free trade agreements over the past few decades. Some 
of them are still in the process of being ratified, such as the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP). People worldwide have severely 
criticized the content of the TPP and have pointed out that the TPP 
principally protects the rights of the investors while leaving citizens 
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in vulnerable conditions. For instance, the language of the TPP 
states in general that a measure adopted by a State to protect a 
legitimate welfare objective should not be considered as indirect 
expropriation except in rare circumstances. This exception and other 
issues, regarding the regulatory powers of a State, have been at the 
center of several debates. This article reviews some of these debates 




Estados alrededor del mundo han firmado de manera creciente 
varios tratados modernos de inversión y acuerdos de libre comercio 
en las últimas décadas. Algunos de ellos todavía están en proceso de 
ratificación, como el Acuerdo Transpacífico de Cooperación 
Económica (TPP en sus siglas en ingles). Personas de todo el mundo 
han criticado severamente las negociaciones del TPP y han señalado 
que el TPP protege principalmente los derechos de los inversionistas 
y deja a las comunidades en condiciones vulnerables. Por ejemplo, 
el lenguaje de TPP establece en general que una medida adoptada 
por un Estado para proteger un objetivo de bienestar legítimo no 
debe ser considerada como expropiación indirecta excepto en raras 
circunstancias. Esta excepción y otras cuestiones relativas al poder 
regulador de un estado han creado varios debates. Este artículo 
recolecta estos debates y destaca el impacto del lenguaje del TPP en 
futuros tratados y acuerdos. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (the “TPP” or “the treaty”) 
was signed on February 4, 2016. It was the end product of five 
years of negotiations between twelve countries and is the largest 
global trade agreement in the last twenty years.2 Prior to the 
                                                             
2 Once ratified, TPP would become the largest trade bloc on earth, 
concentrating forty percent of the world’s gross domestic product. The 
signatories represent around 40 percent of the global economy and a quarter 
of world trade. Membership to the TPP is also open to other Asia-Pacific 
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expansion in 2016, the TPP was a regional free trade agreement 
between the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Mexico, Chile, Peru and Brunei 
(“TPP Member States”).3 The TPP made history as the first ever 
mega-regional treaty to be concluded.4 However, its ratification 
has been tainted by uncertainty after the United States Government 
signed an executive order to withdraw from TPP negotiations and 
the treaty overall.5 
Notwithstanding the result of the TPP’s negotiations, the 
language of the TPP set the basis for Bilateral Investment Treaty 
(BIT) and Free Trade Agreement reforms that are pending 
approval, ratification, and renegotiation. 
Critics of the TPP, including experts in law and economics, 
have warned about the dangers of the Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS) mechanism included in the TPP.6 One major 
critique is that this mechanism impacts the sovereign rights of a 
State7 and weakens the rule of law.8 Critics contest that States’ 
                                                             
countries, with both Republic of Korea and Indonesia expressing a strong 
interest in becoming signatories. See GITANJALI BAJAJ ET AL., DLA PIPER, 
THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP SERIES: NAVIGATING A NEW ERA OF 
TRADE IN THE PACIFIC RIM: PART I – INVESTMENT PROTECTIONS & 
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, 2 (2016), 
https://www.dlapiper.com/~/media/Files/Insights/Publications/2016/04/TPP%20
Series_Part_1.pdf.  
3 Id. (“The signatories represent around 40 per cent of the global economy 
and a quarter of world trade. Membership to the TPP is also open to other 
Asia-Pacific countries, with both Korea and Indonesia expressing a strong 
interest in becoming signatories.”). 
4 See PETER DRAPER ET AL., EUROPEAN CTR. FOR INT’L POLITICAL ECON., 
MEGA-REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AFRICAN, 
CARIBBEAN, AND PACIFIC COUNTRIES 8, (2004), 
http://ecipe.org//app/uploads/2014/12/OCC22014.pdf (coining the term ‘mega-
regional).  
5 Presidential Memo, 82 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 23, 2017). 
6 162 CONG. REC. S480 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2016) (Statement of Senator Warren). 
7 Opponents to the TPP have argued that in general the ISDS system attacks 
the sovereignty of States because arbitral tribunals rather national courts 
analyze whether government measures fulfill international investment 
standards and consequently if such government can be found liable 
internationally. 
8 LAURENCE TRIBE ET AL., 220+ LAW AND ECONOMICS PROFESSORS URGE 
AN ANALYSIS OF TPP’S LANGUAGE REGARDING STATES’ POWERS TO REGULATE  
 26 
sovereign rights are affected because States do not have freedom 
to adopt regulatory measures in certain circumstances under the 
Treaty. This is reflected in a recent trend of cases brought by 
investors, who have challenged States’ regulatory measures passed 
in times of emergency, measures related to the use of natural 
resources, and public health measures, all of which include 
sensitive issues.9 
Proponents posit that past experience has shown that ISDS 
is not a threat to a national government’s regulatory power, as 
many critics claim. Out of the hundreds of resolved ISDS cases 
worldwide, few involved cases against legislative governmental 
actions, and cases that did challenge such sovereign actions, rarely 
succeeded.10 The majority of measures that are challenged by 
investors involve breaches of administrative law, rather than 
general regulatory powers of States. 
Central to the discussion by TPP critics is the treaty’s 
language defending States’ sovereign regulatory power. By 
incorporating language stating that regulatory actions should not 
be considered indirect expropriation, so long as they are designed 
and applied to protect legitimate public objectives, critics feel as 
though the TPP goes too far in protecting States’ regulatory 
                                                             
CONGRESS TO REJECT THE TPP AND OTHER PROSPECTIVE DEALS THAT 
I=INCLUDE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS), 2, (2016), 
https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/isds-law-economics-professors-letter-
sept-2016.pdf; see also NIGEL CORY & STEPHEN EZELL, INFO. TECH. & 
INNOVATION FOUND., HOW TPP CRITICS MUDDLE FACTS, FICTIONS, AND 
UNFOUNDED FEARS: A POINT-BY-POINT ANALYSIS 15 (2016), 
http://www2.itif.org/2016-tpp-critics-muddle-facts-
fiction.pdf?_ga=2.241631746.1268927901.1537972815-
1923363078.1537823248. (“The most serious accusation leveled against 
ISDS are that it undermines state sovereignty, as it can overturn domestic 
court decisions and force a country to damage its laws – both of which are 
false. ISDS is not a threat to the core responsibilities of governments – it 
cannot be used to attack a country’s health and social security systems, and 
regulations in the TPP explicitly confirm that every country retain the right 
to regulate in its public interest, including with regard to health, safety, the 
financial sector, and environment protection.”). 
9 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/10/7, Award (Jul. 8, 2016). 
10 Cory, supra note 8, at 16. 
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powers.11 These contentious TPP provisions will be analyzed in the 
following sections. 
 
II. INVESTMENT AND EXCEPTION CHAPTERS 
The Investment and Exception chapters of the TPP contain 
language dealing with a State’s regulatory power. The Investment 
Chapter of the TPP (Chapter Nine) offers investors a guideline that 
is considered to be the “Standard suite” of investment 
protections.12 These provisions incorporate language such as “rare 
circumstances” and “otherwise consistent with this chapter” 13 to 
emphasize that regulatory measures adopted under a State power 
to regulate should not be considered an indirect expropriation, 
unless it meets such standards.14 There are also several key 
provisions regarding investment protections in the TPP that host 
States must guarantee in order to fulfill the object and purpose of 
the treaty. These investment protections include, but are not limited 
to: National Treatment, Most-Favorable Nation Treatment, 
Minimum Standard of Treatment, and Expropriation and 
Compensation standards. 
Additionally, the Exception Chapter of the TPP sets the language 
of the carve out clause regarding Tobacco Control.15 Both chapters 
                                                             
11 Regulatory measures regarding public health, safety and environment can be 
considered as a legitimate public objective that a State can adopt to protect its 
citizens.  
12 The TPP offers what can be thought of as the standard suite of protections for 
investors in the territory of the other Parties. These measures, which in the TPP 
generally govern both pre-establishment and post-establishments investments, 
include: National Treatment, Most Favoured Nation, Expropriation, Fair and 
Equitable Treatment, and more. See John W. Boscariol & Robert A. Glasgow, 
Trans-Pacific Partnership—Investment Protection and Investor-State Claims, 
MCCARTHY TETRAULT (Nov. 26, 2015), 
https://www.mccarthy.ca/en/insights/blogs/terms-trade/trans-pacific-partnership-
investment-protection-and-investor-state-claims. 
13 Trans-Pacific Partnership, art. 9.16, annex 9-B, Feb. 4, 2016, never ratified, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Investment.pdf  
14 Such measures can be adopted in the context of public health, safety, 
environmental and other regulatory objectives.  
15 Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 13, art. 29.5, 
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language has been heavily criticized and left open to interpretation.  
This article will highlight these criticisms and interpretations 
through three main considerations. The intention behind this article 
is to highlight positive aspects of the TPP’s language dealing with 
State power to regulate and proposes that this language be used in 
future negotiations of BITs and Free Trade Agreements. 
 
A.  REGARDING “RARE CIRCUMSTANCES” 
Article 9.8: Expropriation and Compensation in the TPP states that: 
1. No Party shall expropriate or nationalize a covered 
investment either directly or indirectly through 
measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization 
(expropriation), except: 
(a) for a public purpose; 
(b) in a non-discriminatory manner; 
(c) on payment of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3 
and 4; and 
(d) in accordance with due process of law.16 
 
This provision is similar to stipulations in other international 
investment agreements (“IIAs”). It protects a covered investment 
from both direct expropriation, the transfer of title or seizure of 
property,17  and from indirect expropriation.18 Indirect 
                                                             
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Exceptions-and-General-
Provisions.pdf. 
16 Id. art. 9.8, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Investment.pdf. 
17 Mariana Pendás & Eduardo Mathison, TPP and Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement: An Intertwined Spectrum of Options for Investors?, 11 GLOBAL 
TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 157, 158 (2016). 
18 An action or series of actions by a TPP State Member that have an effect 
equivalent to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright 
seizure. See GITANJALI BAJAJ ET AL., supra note 2, at 2 (“The signatories 
represent around 40 per cent of the global economy and a quarter of world 
trade. Membership to the TPP is also open to other Asia-Pacific countries, 
with both Korea and Indonesia expressing a strong interest in becoming 
THE ARBITRATION BRIEF 
 29 
expropriation has become a defining characteristic of the right to 
regulate.19 In this respect, investors should be aware that the TPP 
language provides certain limitations on the scope of an 
investments protection and was designed to preserve the freedom 
of TPP Member States to regulate in areas of public welfare, 
environment, and health.20 This language was also incorporated 
into Annex 9-B 3(b) of the investment chapter as an additional 
source of Article 9.8 interpretation that regulates expropriation and 
compensation. This annex states that: 
“Non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are 
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare 
objectives, such as public health, safety and the 
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations, 
except in rare circumstances.”21 (emphasis added) 
From a quick reading of this provision, it seems that State’s 
sovereign right to adopt regulatory action to protect legitimate 
public welfare objectives should not be considered an indirect 
expropriation. However, the language “except in rare 
circumstances” opens the door to interpretation. Critics have 
focused on the words “rare circumstances” because the Investment 
                                                             
signatories.”). 
19 CHRISTIAN TIETJE, FREYA RAETENS & ECORYS, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN 
TRADE & DEV. COOPERATION, THE IMPACT OF INVESTOR-STATE-DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT (ISDS) IN THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT 




20 Pendás & Mathison, supra note 17, at 158–159. (“Since 2004, IIA 
provisions have addressed the fear of States to provide them with the ability 
to regulate health, welfare and environment issues, and at the same time, the 
fear no to be impeded or punish with less investment.”). 
21 Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 13, annex 9-B n.37 (“For greater 
certainty and without limiting the scope of this subparagraph, regulatory 
actions to protect public health include, among others, such measures with 
respect to the regulation, pricing and supply of, and reimbursement for, 
pharmaceuticals (including biological products), diagnostics, vaccines, 
medical devices, gene therapies and technologies, health-related aids and 
appliances and blood and blood-related products.”).  
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Chapter of the TPP does not clarify the meaning of this standard.22 
In this regard, and because of a lack of guidance, a future 
international arbitral tribunal could interpret a regulation to be an 
indirect expropriation even when such the measure, in another 
context, could be adopted and applied to protect legitimate public 
welfare objectives. 
It has been theorized that the language used in Annex 9-B, 
rather than be a safeguard, can act as a loophole to allow foreign 
corporations to challenge new State regulations, if such regulation 
diminished the value of the investor’s operations.23 Therefore, while 
the United State Trade Representative (USTR) touts this provision 
to be a safeguard, the ISDS tribunal has the power to decide which 
environmental or other public interest policies fall into the “rare 
circumstances” loophole.24 
Even when there is no elaboration on when “rare 
circumstances” arise to render an otherwise non-compensable 
expropriation compensable, the absence of a regulatory 
expropriation in the applicable treaty does not foreclose States 
defending a taking as non-compensable,25 or the investor from 
defending a taking as compensable.26 In other words, if a treaty does 
                                                             
22 Tsai-yu Lin, Preventing Tobacco Companies’ Interference with Tobacco 
Control Through Investor-State Dispute Settlement under the TPP, 8 ASIAN J. 
WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 565, 576 (2013).  
23 ILANA SOLOMON & BEN BEACHY, SIERRA CLUB, A DIRTY DEAL: HOW THE 




(“Some argue that the TPP’s inclusion of this expansion foreign investor 
right could allow a foreign corporation, like BHP Billiton, for example, to 
challenge a new environmental regulation, such as additional permit 
requirement, as a TPP- prohibited “indirect expropriation” if it diminished 
the value of its fracking operations.”). 
24 LAURENCE TRIBE ET AL., supra note 8, at 2. 
25 Jean Ho, Investment Protection Under Succession Treaties 32 ICSID Rev. 
Foreign Investment L.J. 59, 74 (2017). 
26 Les Laboratoires Servier, S.A.S. v. Republic of Poland, Case No. II 
SA.Wa 838/13, Award (Redacted), ¶¶ 582-584 (Feb. 14, 2012). (“Thus, the 
burden then falls onto the Claimants to show that Poland's regulatory actions 
were inconsistent with a legitimate exercise of Poland's police powers. If the 
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not establish in which rare circumstances a State’s action can be 
compensable, the parties shall follow the general principle in 
international adjudication that “whoever asserts must prove”. In 
order to do so, the party that asserts the claim must obtain and 
present the necessary evidence in order to prove its assertion.27 The 
parties might also take into consideration that any interpretation they 
reach should be according to the object and purpose of the treaty.28 
Independently of what side one may fall on, State or 
investor, by incorporating such language in the TPP, Member States 
have negotiated for this mandatory rule in order to protect their 
regulatory actions. There is a well-known phrase that “every rule 
has an exception,” and this language “rare circumstances” might be 
one of them. It will be up to arbitral tribunals and the ability of a 
party’s counsel to demonstrate that a specific State’s regulatory 
action falls under such exception. In this respect, parties will play a 
crucial role in overcoming and giving meaning to this high standard 
of burden of proof. 
 
B. REGARDING THE PROVISION “OTHERWISE CONSISTENT 
WITH THIS CHAPTER” 
Article 9.16 “Investment and Environmental, Health and other 
Regulatory Objectives” is included in the Investment Chapter of the 
TPP. This article states: 
“Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent 
a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any 
measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it 
                                                             
Claimants produce sufficient evidence for such a showing, the burden shifts 
to Poland to rebut it.”). 
27 Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 
Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ¶ 215 
(Sept. 1, 2009). (“[T]he Committee considers the general principle in ICSID 
proceedings, and in international adjudication generally, to be that “who asserts 
must prove”, and that in order to do so, the party which asserts must itself obtain 
and present the necessary evidence in order to prove what it asserts.”) 
28 See Investment, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-
partnership/tpp-chapter-chapter-negotiating-3 (last visited Sept. 26, 2016). 
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considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity 
in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to 
environmental, health or other regulatory objectives.” 
(Emphasis added)29 
 
The language “otherwise consistent with this chapter” is 
essentially a window dressing. In essence, the provision states that 
a party can regulate however it chooses, as long as it does not 
violate other obligations stated in the investment chapter. While 
the language of the TPP might “underscore” countries’ rights to 
regulate in the public interest, the treaty does not actually protect 
that right.30 Instead, this article will likely provide only a slight 
interpretive gloss in favor of protecting public interest measures,31 
indicating to investors that such regulations are still able to be 
changed. For example, if good faith measures are taken in the 
public interest, they can still be successfully challenged under the 
agreement as violating the TPP’s investor protections and thus 
negate any protections otherwise purported to be given under that 
article.32 
Similarly, TPP Member States have the freedom to adopt 
measures appropriate to ensure that investment activity in their 
territories are undertaken in a manner sensitive to their 
environment, health or other regulatory objectives, provided that 
such measures are not otherwise inconsistent with the investment 
                                                             
29 Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 13, art. 9.16, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Investment.pdf.  
30 See Lise Johnson & Lisa Sachs, The TPP’s Investment Chapter: 
Entrenching, Rather than Reforming, a Flawed System, COLUMBIA CTR. ON 
SUSTAINABLE INV. 2 (Nov. 2015), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/11/TPP-
entrenching-flaws-21-Nov-FINAL.pdf. (“That article [9.16] provides no such 
real protection. Rather, it simply notes that the government can regulate in 
the public interest as long as, when doing so, the government complies with 
the Investment Chapter’s requirement regarding treatment of foreign 
investors and investments.”).  
31 Trading Views: Real Debates on Key Issues in TPP, Hearing on Trans 
Pacific Partnership Before the Subcomm. On Trade, 114th Cong. (Dec. 2, 
2015) (Statements of Ways and Means Democrats). 
32 Johnson & Sachs, supra note 30, at 2. 
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chapter.33 In other words, Member States have the  freedom to 
adopt regulations assuming that these measures do not otherwise 
constitute a breach of obligations set forth in the investment 
chapter. It is important to note here that TPP Member States have 
clearly used language favoring States’ regulatory powers. In this 
respect, Article 9.16 expressly states that Member States have not 
only legitimacy to adopt regulatory actions recognized in article 9. 
8, but also to maintain or enforce such measures to ensure that 
investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner 
sensitive to environmental, health, or other regulatory objectives.34 
Nevertheless, a state that is going to exercise such regulatory 
power should not act arbitrarily or in violation of other obligations 
stated in the investment chapter, as is required by the language 
“otherwise consistent with this chapter.” Therefore, in the context 
of the TPP and ISDS, State regulation should protect legitimate 
objectives in order to guarantee investor rights. Based on fairness, 
it cannot be justified to grant rights to one party (a State) and not 
another (an investor). 
This provision of Article 9.16 (“otherwise consistent with 
this chapter”) can help lawyers to improve their arguments during 
arbitration proceedings. In this regard, parties in a dispute must 
demonstrate that either the State respected its obligations when 
exercising its legitimate regulatory power, or that such regulatory 
power did not comport with the treaty’s explicit obligations. 
 
                                                             
33 The briefing also states that The TPPA’s Chapter 9 (the Investment 
Chapter): (i) guarantees important protections to investments made by those 
nationals or companies; and (ii) contains investor-State dispute settlement 
(ISDS) provisions that entitle investors to submit disputes with TPP State 
Member to binding international arbitration. Much is the same as in other 
free trade and investment-protection agreements, but there are important 
differences requiring careful attention. See Investment Protection and 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement under the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER (Nov. 17, 2015), 
http://knowledge.freshfields.com/en/Global/r/1325/investment_protection_a
nd_investor-state_dispute. 
34 Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 13, art. 9.16, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Investment.pdf. 
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C.  THE TPP DOES NOT INCLUDE ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH 
ISSUES AS CARVE OUTS. 
Article 29.5 “Tobacco Control Measures” states that: 
“A Party may elect to deny the benefits of Section B of 
Chapter 9 (Investment) with respect to claims 
challenging a tobacco control measure35 of the Party. 
Such a claim shall not be submitted to arbitration under 
Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment) if a Party has made 
such an election….” (Emphasis added)36 
This article of the TPP embodies the carve-out clause of 
Tobacco Control Measures.37 While the treaty has established filter 
mechanisms to avoid international claims38 in other areas of public 
                                                             
35Id., art. 29.5 n.12, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-
Exceptions-and-General-Provisions.pdf (“A tobacco control measure means a 
measure of a Party related to the production or consumption of manufactured 
tobacco products (including products made or derived from tobacco), their 
distribution, labelling, packaging, advertising, marketing, promotion, sale, 
purchase, or use, as well as enforcement measures, such as inspection, 
recordkeeping, and reporting requirements. For greater certainty, a measure 
with respect to tobacco leaf that is not in the possession of a manufacturer of 
tobacco products or that is not part of a manufactured tobacco product is not 
a tobacco control measure.”). 
36 Id. art. 29.5, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Exceptions-
and-General-Provisions.pdf. 
37 Id. It seems that this carve-out was formulated in response to the 
investment claim that a multinational Tobacco company brought against 
Australia to challenge the Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill (2011). See also 
Taejoon Ahn, THE UTILITY OF CARVE-OUT CLAUSES IN ADDRESSING 
REGULATORY CONCERNS IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 12 ASIAN 
INT’L ARB. J. 65, 72, 76 (2016) (“[T]o avoid regulatory concerns in certain 
regulatory areas, states need to carve out certain areas involving their vital 
regulatory concerns from the scope of international obligations in advance in 
the exercise of their sovereign choice. This is because just as the consent to 
international investment disciplines depends on a sovereign choice of each 
state, so the scope of the consent, namely the choice of certain areas 
included in the agreement and the exclusion of other areas from the 
agreement, is up to the sovereign state . . . . The carve-out clause is expected 
to be adopted by the new version of investment treaties as an effective 
instrument for alleviating regulatory concerns in terms of legal certainty, 
predictability and political acceptability.”). 
38 Johnson & Sachs, supra note 30, at 3. 
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interest such as taxation measures39 and financial services 
regulations, this does not mean that such regulations are not subject 
to conditions, such as the “exceptional circumstances” measure, 
included in Article 29.3 of the treaty.40 
The fact that there are no filter mechanisms, as explained 
above, relating to environmental protection or public health issues 
in the TPP, has been criticized.41 Authors have questioned why this 
clause is so narrow, applying only to tobacco measures, when 
governments deal with a much wider array of health and 
environmental issues which would merit exclusion from arbitration 
proceedings just as often.42 
Other authors have used this carve-out clause to demonstrate 
that TPP Member States intentionally protected their regulatory 
power when public welfare objectives are at issue.43 The will of 
TPP Member States is clear when public welfare objectives are 
                                                             
39 Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 13, art. 29.4.9, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Exceptions-and-General-
Provisions.pdf (“Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Singapore from 
adopting taxation measures no more trade restrictive than necessary to 
address Singapore’s public policy objectives arising out of its specific 
constraints of space.”). 
40 Mélida Hodgson, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Investment Chapter Set a 
New Worldwide Standard COLUMBIA FDI PERSPECTIVES 1 (Nov. 9 2015), 
https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D86Q25WM/download 
(“Then there is a provision in the General Exceptions chapter allowing 
temporary financial safeguards in ‘exceptional circumstances.’ Clearly, the 
shadow of the Argentina investment jurisprudence looms large—various 
Asian-Pacific countries themselves had to deal with a scarring financial 
crisis around the same time.”); see also Nahila Cortes, Indirect 
Expropriation under the TPP: A New Frontier for the Right of States to 
Regulate?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Dec. 20 2015), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2015/12/20/indirect-
expropriation-under-the-tpp-a-new-frontier-for-the-right-of-states-to-
regulate/ (“Article 29.3 recognizes that the State may adopt or maintain 
restrictive temporary financial safeguards in exceptional circumstances if 
they are consistent with the TPP.”). 
41 Johnson & Sachs, supra note 30, at 3. 
42 Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, How the Investment Chapter of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Falls Short, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. BLOG (Nov. 
6, 2015), https://www.iisd.org/blog/how-investment-chapter-trans-pacific-
partnership-falls-short.  
43 GITANJALI BAJAJ ET AL., supra note 2, at 4.  
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involved, such as the regulation of tobacco packaging, which is that 
States should have more leeway and protections to regulate.44 
The fact that tobacco control measures are continually used 
as examples of States’ regulatory power to protect public health, 
and excluded from international claims, can be used as an analogy 
in future environmental cases. States could establish that 
environmental measures similar to tobacco control measures are 
adopted to protect their citizens’ health, and should be excluded 
from international claims and considered as part of a State 
sovereign power to regulate. In general, both the tobacco and 
environmental State regulatory powers protect public welfare 
objectives. The question of why environmental, health, and other 
measures were not also incorporated as carve-outs in the TPP may 
not be solved in the near future. Without a doubt, the incorporation 
of tobacco control measures is a positive step in the development 
of the international investment regime. Continued discussion of 
these environmental and health issues will help to set new 
standards to be included as carve-outs in future BITs and other Free 
Trade Agreements. 
CONCLUSION 
 One cannot deny the tremendous work that TPP’s Member 
States have put in to incorporate standards that were the subject of 
criticism over the past few years, in particular the express 
incorporation of the State power to regulate based on legitimate 
public welfare objectives. The fact that this provision is included 
in the TPP progresses the development of the international 
investment arbitration regime and opens the doors for future 
discussions in the field. This article presents analysis of TPP treaty 
language and highlights the positive aspects of it, with the aim of 
encouraging the audience to consider the positive impacts of this 
language for future BITs and Free Trade Agreements.
                                                             
44 Luis Miguel Velarde Saffer & Amir Ardelan Farhadi, ISDS in the TPP: Is 
the Recent Uproar in the US Merited?—Part II, Kluwer Arb. Blog (Nov. 7 
2016), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/11/07/isds-in-the-
tpp-is-the-recent-uproar-in-the-us-merited-part-ii/. 
